When direct 'addressing is used, the component number (logical address) assigned to a record is equal to the key of the record ( true false). Direct addressing will not be feasible for any applications until the main menory of computers gets larger ( true / false 13. The worst case Big-o run-time of binary search tree is 12. The average case Big-o run-time of binary search tree is 11. Binary search can be executed on a binary file true false true false 1 10. Binary search can be executed on a linked-list 9. The HoEst case Big-o run-time of binary search 8. The average case Big-o tun-time of binary search is 7. Sequential search executes faster when the data is sorted truealse ) 6. The data must be sorted in order to use sequential search true false 5. The average case Big o run time of sequential search is he worst case Bigo run-time of sequential search is 4. Sequential search can be applied to any data structure (true talse 2. Organ.Transcribed image text: Review: Searching Techniques 1. Zhou, J.: Ordered search in differentiated markets. Wolinsky, A.: True monopolistic competition as a result of imperfect information. Wilson, C.M.: Ordered search and equilibrium obfuscation. Topkis, D.M.: Minimizing a submodular function on a lattice. Stigler, G.J.: The economics of information. Stahl, D.O.: Oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search. Rosen, J.B.: Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave N-person games. Rhodes, A.: Can prominence matter even in an almost frictionless market? Econ. Reinganum, J.F.: A simple model of equilibrium price dispersion. Quah, J.K.-H., Strulovici, B.: Comparative statics, informativeness, and the interval dominance order. Moraga-González, J.L., Sándor, Z., Wildenbeest, M.R.: Simultaneous Search for differentiated products: the impact of search costs and firm prominence. Milgrom, P., Shannon, C.: Monotone comparative statics. Milgrom, P., Roberts, J.: Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities. Menzio, G., Trachter, N.: Equilibrium price dispersion across and within stores. Menzio, G., Trachter, N.: Equilibrium price dispersion with sequential search. McCall, J.J.: Economics of information and job search. Konovalov, A., Sándor, Z.: On price equilibrium with multi-product firms. Kellogg, R.: Uniqueness in the Schauder fixed point theorem. Janssen, M.C.W., Parakhonyak, A.: Consumer search markets with costly revisits. Janssen, M.C., Moraga-González, J.L.: Strategic pricing, consumer search and the number of firms. Heinsalu, S.: Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality. Haan, M.A., Moraga-González, J.L.: Advertising for attention in a consumer search model. Gaumont, D., Schindler, M., Wright, R.: Alternative theories of wage dispersion. Theory 3, 156–168 (1971)ĭzyabura, D., Hauser, J.R.: Recommending products when consumers learn their preference weights. Econometrica 86, 1257–1281 (2018)Ĭorchón, L.C., Marini, M.A.: Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II: Applications, vol. 2, Edward Elgar Publishing (2018)Ĭurtis, E., Wright, R.: Price setting, price dispersion, and the value of money: or, the law of two prices. 26, 285–298 (1989)Ĭhen, Y., Zhang, T.: Equilibrium price dispersion with heterogeneous searchers. Econometrica 51, 955–969 (1983)Ĭarpenter, G.S., Nakamoto, K.: Consumer preference formation and pioneering advantage. 40, 209–233 (2009)īaye, M.R., Morgan, J., Scholten, P.: Information, search, and price dispersion. Anderson, S.P., Renault, R.: Pricing, product diversity, and search costs: a Bertrand–Chamberlin–Diamond model.
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